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Emerging market economies have recently accumulated large stocks of foreign reserves. In 
this paper we address the question of what are the main factors accounting for reserve 
holdings in nine developing countries located in Asia and Latin America. Monthly data from 
January 1985 to May 2006 are used to estimate for each country the long run equilibrium 
reserve demand, based on the buffer stock model, the short run dynamics governing the 
process of reserve accumulation (decumulation) and the factors which may influence the speed 
of adjustment of actual to desired reserves. Cointegration analysis suggests that the buffer 
stock precautionary model accounts for the optimal reserve demand. The corresponding VECMs 
are further interpolated, using the permanent and transitory innovations decomposition 
procedure of Gonzalo and Ng (2001), in order to assess the relative impact of the time series 
on the convergence to equilibrium after a shock. Finally the (asymmetric) effect on the speed 
of convergence of positive/negative changes in signal variables - such as the excess reserves 
of the previous period, relative competitiveness and US monetary stance - is found to be 
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The rapid process of reserve accumulation in emerging market economies has become 
one of the most controversial topics in international economics, coming under 
investigation in a burgeoning literature. By the end of December 2006 the foreign 
reserve assets of the emerging countries reporting to the IMF were worth over 
$1400bn, 1.4 times their value at the end of  2004. Since reserve accumulation is 
costly it has to be justified by economic benefits. Mercantilist considerations are often 
mentioned, especially in Asia. Most explanations are, however, still based on a self-
insurance rationale; reserves are accumulated in order to avoid the disruptive effects 
of a rapid capital (short-term foreign investment) outflow in periods of stress. This 
interpretation is reminiscent of the models discussed in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
reserves were viewed as a buffer accumulated by the monetary authorities in order to 
avoid exchange rate crises brought about by a drought of international means of 
payments due to current account deficits.   
This cost benefit interpretation has, in spite of the dramatic changes in both the 
volume and the nature of international transactions, and despite the exponential 
growth of international financial markets,  maintained its basic validity. The monetary 
authorities of the emerging market economies accumulate reserves because, in 
periods of stress, they may be unable to borrow on international markets the foreign 
funds needed to offset sudden capital outflows. They find themselves in the same 
predicament as the authorities of the industrialized countries of the previous decades, 
when the possibility of financing a deficit on international markets was – for 
institutional reasons – very limited. We therefore maintain that the traditional buffer 
stock precautionary model of 1970-1980 vintage continues to offer a valid explanation 
of the optimal reserve demand on the part of the emerging market economies. This 
does not mean, however, that issues currently discussed in the literature, such as 
mercantilistic real exchange rate manipulation or fear of floating, are irrelevant to   2
reserves management policies.
1 Indeed, as we shall see, they do play a relevant role 
in the short run and affect the speed of adjustment of current reserves to their 
optimal long run level.  
In this paper monthly data from January 1985 to May 2006 are used to investigate 
the national idiosyncratic and international determinants of reserve changes in nine 
emerging market economies located  in Asia and  Latin America. Given the broad data 
span it is possible to estimate, for each country, both the long run equilibrium reserve 
demand, the short run dynamics governing the process of reserve accumulation 
(decumulation) and the factors which may influence the speed of adjustment of actual 
to desired reserves. The non-stationary nature of the data dictates the choice of 
estimation procedure. The long run demand for reserves is quantified by cointegration 
relationships and the short run dynamics are modelled with Vector Error Correction 
parameterizations.  
Cointegration reserve demand equations are first independently estimated for each 
country. The Gonzalo and Ng (2001) procedure is then used to assess the relative 
impact of the differing time series on  the convergence to equilibrium after a shock. 
Finally, investigation turns to the (asymmetric) impact of positive/negative changes in 
signal variables, such as the excess reserves of the previous period, and of  relative 
competitiveness and US monetary stance indicators on the speed of convergence. 
From an economic point of view the cointegration residual time series are assumed to 
quantify the fraction of the long run reserve holdings that cannot be accounted for by 
the buffer stock model explanatory variables, viz. domestic factors such as balance of 
payments variability, and a national short term rate which measures the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves. International explanatory factors, reflecting the pivotal role 
                                                           
1 Recent contributions on this topic by Aizenman et al. (2004) and Aizenman and Lee (2005), 
among others, simply add control variables in static reserve demand relationship estimates 
and disregard the information provided by the dynamics of reserve accumulation.    3
played by the US monetary authorities in emerging markets finance and mercantilistic 
motives, affect the short run disequilibrium dynamics. 
The paper improves upon previous research in the following respects: 
-  the analysis of the adjustment process is consistent with the stringent 
restrictions of cointegration analysis dynamics and a distinction is drawn 
between the factors which enter the long run equilibrium demand for reserves 
and those which appear only in the short run; 
-  the variable which, in each country, brings about a readjustment after a shock 
to the equilibrium demand for reserves is carefully identified; in all but two 
cases the reserves do play the prominent  role; 
-  the impact of exogenous international factors on the speed of adjustment of 
reserves is then investigated in contexts of both positive and negative 
overstocking; it sheds light on the role of reserve positive (negative) shifts on 
the mercantilist policies, and on the reaction of the countries in the sample to 
US interest rates.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the tenets of the buffer stock 
model of reserve demand and the recent issues set out in the literature; section 2 
estimates reserve demand in the emerging markets of the sample using time series 
and cointegration analysis procedures, and investigates the dynamics of the 
adjustment process in each country VECM; section 3 analyses the reaction of excess 
reserve accumulation to the innovations in past reserve changes and in international 
competitiveness and financial liquidity indicators. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
1 The buffer stock model and the demand for reserves 
 
The buffer stock model posits that the authorities select the stock of reserves which 
balances the potential macroeconomic costs due to the lack of reserves with the   4
opportunity cost of reserve accumulation. In this section the basic tenets of the model 
are set forth, from the original version by Heller (1966) to the more sophisticated 
stochastic one by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), along with some recent extensions. 
The factors that influence the speed of adjustment of reserves to their optimal desired 
level are then investigated. 
 
1.1  The basic model 
 
An adequate stock of reserves smoothes out payment disequilibria and prevents costly 
financial readjustments. The Asian crisis has shown that countries holding large 
reserves were able to weather it better than the others. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) 
estimated that a country would reduce by ten percent the probability of experiencing 
a sharp capital outflow if it were to abide by the Guidotti rule and hold reserves equal 
to its short term debt. 
Reserves thus provide a self-insurance service that has to be paid for with the 
opportunity cost of investing financial resources in potentially sub-optimal foreign 
currency assets. The first formal discussion of precautionary optimal reserve 
management, based on the minimization of the total cost of financing and adjusting to 
external shocks, can be found in Heller (1966); it provides the basic framework for 
most subsequent research in the field. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) extend a 
previous contribution by Hamada and Ueda (1977) developing a rigorous – possibly 
definitive - formal setting of the hypotheses set out in Heller. 
Reserves follow in their model a Wiener process and, immediately after a restocking, 
the authorities select the initial level that minimizes total expected costs. The latter 
have two interrelated stochastic components: (i) the opportunity cost of reserve 
holdings and (ii) the adjustment cost of reserve restocking whenever the latter have 
reached a lower limit, set here to zero. The adjustment cost stems from the output   5
reduction brought about by the need to generate the balance of payments surplus 
which will in turn generate the reserve build up. A higher variability implies that 
reserves are likely to reach their lower bound more often and require costly 
restockings. The authorities are faced with a standard cost-benefit choice: the larger 
the stock of reserves, the lower is the expected cost of adjustment and the higher the 
expected value of the opportunity cost (and vice versa). 
After some algebraic manipulation, Frenkel and Jovanovic obtain the following 
approximation of optimal initial reserve holdings ( 0 R )  
 
r C R log 25 . 0 log 5 . 0 log log 0 − + = σ                                                                           (1)  
 
where σ is the balance of payments variability, r the opportunity cost and C the fixed 
cost of accumulating reserves. The additional hypothesis is then made that observable 
reserves  t R  are proportional to optimal (initial) reserves up to an error term that is 
uncorrelated with the above mentioned right hand variables, i.e., in logarithmic terms, 
that  
 
t t u R A R + + = 0 log log                                                                                           (1’) 
 
Adding as additional scale variable the level of imports  t M , the following testable 
relationship is then derived 
 
t t t t t u r b M b b b R + + + + = log log log log 3 2 1 0 σ                                                                (2)   6
where it is assumed a priori that  0 1 > b ,  0 2 > b  and  0 3 < b .
2 
The explanatory power of the buffer stock model, both in the industrialized and in the 
developing countries, has been investigated in a large empirical literature spanning 
more than twenty years, and summarized in Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown (2002). 
 
1.2 Recent issues on optimal reserve accumulation 
 
Two major strands can be identified in the recent literature on the buffer stock model. 
The first attempts to adapt it to the institutional and financial characteristics of 
emerging market economies. Aizenman and Marion (2002, 2004) augment a 
relationship analogous to equation (2) with political uncertainty and corruption proxies 
and show that they affect reserve holdings in developing countries. They view 
reserves as a form of precautionary saving for countries with difficult access to global 
capital markets and insufficient domestic tax collection. Reserves are also seen as 
output stabilizers. Aizenman et al. (2004) point out that reserve holdings mitigate the 
probability of a banking crisis and reduce the expected cost of a sudden freeze of 
international capital inflows. As demonstrated in Aizenman and Lee (2005), a macro-
liquidity shock to an emerging market cannot be diversified away and may force 
liquidation of a first period investment if it exceeds the level of reserves outstanding, 
reducing second period output.  
                                                           
2 Reserve holdings are reduced if the opportunity cost rises and increased whenever the 
volatility index rises. The coefficient of the value of imports is positive. It reflects the 
requirements of international trade on the banks’ transactions demand for reserves. We are 
not imposing here the additional restrictions that b1 = 0.5 and b3 = -0.25 even if, as we shall 
see below, the estimated cointegration coefficients take values that are surprisingly close to 
the theoretical ones.   7
The second strand focuses on quantitative analysis of the cost-benefit structure of the 
model. García and Soto (2004) and Rodrik (2006), among others, adopt an approach 
originally set out by Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) to evaluate the impact of reserve 
accumulation on the probability of default and compare the opportunity cost of excess 
reserve holdings with the corresponding estimated benefits. The latter are given by 
the output loss that is avoided thanks to the reduction in the probability of a financial 
crisis brought about by the accumulation of reserves. It should be noticed that the 
cost of reserve depletion is now explicitly associated with the output cost of a default. 
 
1.3 Modelling the reserve adjustment process 
 
Actual reserve holdings do not always coincide with optimal reserve demand. Indeed, 
a reserve accumulation process is onerous and the adjustment may be protracted 
over time. Kenen and Yudin (1965), Iyoha (1976), Bilson and Frenkel (1979) and 
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) among many others have investigated the dynamics 
of the reserve accumulation. 
They set out a partial adjustment relationship of the form 
 
) log (log ) (log 1
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t R  is the desired (optimal) stock of reserves and γ  measures the speed of 
adjustment. It is usually assumed that  1 0 ≤ < γ .     
The dynamics of our paper are driven by the error correction parameterization of 
cointegration analysis. We have therefore used two complementary procedures that 
are compatible with the Granger Representation Theorem. The first, derived from the 
Gonzalo and Ng (2001) interpolation of the Wold representation of the model, allows   8
us to assess, in each country, the relative impact of the differing time series on the 
convergence to equilibrium after a shock.  
The second focuses on the VECM parameterization itself,  and makes use of a 
Heaviside function in order to isolate the effects of innovations in a set of variables on 
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where  t EC  is the distance between the actual level of reserves and its equilibrium 
value provided by  equation (2).  t X is the (column) vector of I(1) variables of the 
cointegration relationship, 
1
j Γ  is a (row) vector of distributed lag coefficients and  t H  is 
a Heaviside function of specific exogenous factors  ) ( t Z . It models non linearities in the 
adjustment process, on which sound evidence is provided in the literature (see 
Escribano and Granger, 1998, and Escribano and Pfann, 1998, among many others).  
 
2 Assessment of optimal reserve demand   
 
This section describes the econometric strategy used to determine the optimal long 
run demand for reserves. Our measure of reserve adequacy evolves over time and 
provides a dynamic benchmark that can be used to assess the magnitude of 
overstocking. The optimal buffer stock model demand for reserves, discussed in 
section 1.1, is estimated in a two-step multivariate cointegration approach. The data 
set spans the January 1985 – May 2006  time period and encompasses some 
important episodes of distress in both Asia and Latin America.  
   9
2.1 Stationarity and volatility analysis  
 
Recent econometric findings summarized in Vogelsang (1999) have shown that 
additive outliers introduce into the residuals of standard unit root test estimates a 
moving average component with a negative coefficient which, in turn, inflates the size 
of the test and causes over-rejection of the null hypothesis. The Latin American and 
Asiatic crises brought about long lasting changes in Central Bank behavior, and the 
corresponding outliers in the time series may well be considered additive. We 
implemented the test procedure of Perron and Rodríguez (2003) and identified several 
additive outliers.
3 The unit root tests of table A.I, appendix II, are thus performed 
using the statistic by Ng and Perron (2001), which is robust to size distortions due to 
negative serial correlation of the residuals. They fail systematically to reject the null of 
non stationarity. 
Additive outliers may also distort inference on cointegration rank in finite samples 
(Franses and Haldrup, 1994). Following the interpolation strategy suggested by 
Nielsen (2004), the outlying observations are eliminated and replaced with an average 
of the respective adjoining data. The smoothed time series will then be used in the 
cointegration analysis below.  
The balance of payments variability index plays a significant role in models of optimal 
demand for foreign reserves and is to be carefully estimated. Most of the previous 
empirical studies estimate a multiperiod rolling standard deviation of (detrended) 
reserve changes. Our sample period includes spells of turbulence, and the reserve 
changes display volatility clustering i.e. autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.
4 
                                                           
3 The value of test statistics significant at the 5 percent level and the corresponding dates are 
available from the authors upon request. 
4 The presence of ARCH effects is corroborated by the serial correlation of the squared reserve 
increments, assessed with the help of Ljung Box Q-statistics.   10
Unbiased volatility estimates are thus obtained using conditional measures, computed 
as the square root of the (T)GARCH(1,1) variance of monthly reserve changes (for 
more details see Cifarelli and Paladino, 2005).  
 
2.2 Multivariate cointegration estimates of the demand for reserves 
 









1 ' α                                                                          (5) 
 
where Ф is a n x 1 vector of constant terms and  j Γ  is a matrix of distributed lag 
coefficients. B and α are n x m matrices of, respectively, adjustment coefficients and 
cointegration equation coefficients, n being the number of I(1) time series in  t X  and 
m the number of cointegrating relationships.  t X  =  )' log , log , log , (log t t t t r M R σ  , where 
t σ  is the fitted value of a preliminary conditional volatility estimate of the reserve 
change,  t M  is the volume of imports and  t r  is a domestic short term interest  rate.
5  
m = 1 in the empirical analyses below since the trace test statistics of Johansen 
(1991) set out in table A.II of appendix III identify, in each country system, a single 
cointegration relationship. 
                                                           
5 r t is the opportunity cost of holding reserves, which, in the case of emerging markets, are 
mostly invested in US assets. It should thus be measured as the spread between a domestic 
interest rate and a US Treasury bond interest rate. Since the latter is small and tends to vary 
but little with respect to the domestic rate we quantify the opportunity cost as the emerging 
market rate. Only short rates are available over the 1985-2006 time span.      11
Table I presents the  cointegration equation estimates. The long run reserve demand 
is formulated as 
    
t t t t t t X r b M b b t R ε α σ ρ ρ = = − − − − − ' log log log log 3 2 1 1 0                                               (6) 
 
The estimates are obtained using the asymptotically efficient DOLS approach of Stock 
and Watson (1993) and – as pointed out by Maddala and Kim (1999) - are less 
sensitive to the lag specification of the VECM than those computed with the standard 
Johansen maximum likelihood estimation procedure. We choose the lag/lead order at 
which the quality of fit becomes stable, even if the latter reacts only marginally to the 
order of the DOLS specification. Standard errors are computed using the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and correlation consistent procedure. 
Table I  DOLS COINTEGRATION  EQUATION ESTIMATES 
The estimates are rather good and, with a few exceptions, in line with the 
specification of the model. A rise in interest rates is associated with an increase in 
reserve holdings in Brazil and in Malaysia, possibly reflecting - as suggested by 
Aportela et al. (2005) – the effect of foreign capital inflow sterilization policies by local 
monetary authorities. Reserve volatility fits well with the model highlighting  the 
relevance of restocking costs for economies that were most exposed to contagious 
crises and the corresponding coefficients are always significant and of the correct 
sign.
6 The same holds true for the coefficient of the volume of imports, the only 
exceptions being Mexico and Malaysia. The size of these coefficients usually supports 
the hypothesis of economies of scale in the use of reserves. 
                                                           
6 It should be noticed that in the case of Chile and Korea the variability coefficient estimate is 
also close to the theoretical absolute value posited by  the Frenkel and Jovanovic model. The 
same result is obtained for the interest rate coefficient in Indonesia and Venezuela.   12
With the second step the VECM equation (5) is estimated for each country with 
standard VAR parameterization, inserting the lagged estimates of  t X
' α , obtained in 
the first step of the procedure, as a predetermined variable. The corresponding error 
correction coefficients, along with standard tests on the system residuals, are set forth 
in table II.
7 
Table II  ERROR CORRECTION COEFFICIENTS 
The VECM diagnostics are in all cases satisfactory. In most countries the coefficients 
of the lagged cointegration residuals  that correspond to reserves are significantly 
different from zero and suggest that the latter play a relevant role in the error 
correction process. In the case of Singapore and Chile this role seems to be played by 
the rate of interest, either in isolation or along with the remaining variables of the 
system. Analysis of the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks is 
implemented in order to assess these hypotheses.  
 
2.3 Permanent and transitory decomposition of the VECM innovations   
 
Having identified a single cointegration relationship among the four I(1) time series in 
t X , we are left with three permanent shocks or common trends and one transitory 
shock. The approach of Gonzalo and Ng (2001) is applied to decompose  t X  into 
transformed innovations characterized by differing degrees of persistence. 
Starting from the following Wold representation 
                                                           
7 The VAR lag order is carefully ascertained and is similar to the order used in the trace 
cointegration tests set out in the appendix. We follow Urbain (1995) and base the choice of the 
VAR order, in each country, on two criteria: (i) the absence of serial correlation of the residuals 
(using a multivariate LM test for residual correlation originally set forth by Johansen, 1995,   13
 
t t e L C X ) ( + Φ = ∆                                                                                                  (7) 
 
where Φ  is a vector of constant terms,  t e  is an n x 1 vector of residuals and C(L) is a 
matrix of distributed lag coefficients, an n x 1 vector of transformed shocks  t ν  is 
computed where  )' , , , ( 4 3 2 1 t t t t t ν ν ν ν ν = . It is assumed that the first three shocks are 
permanent and the fourth is transitory in the sense of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
They are obtained using the estimated coefficients of the VECM equation (5) above. 
Assuming that  )' ' , (
' α ⊥ Β = G , with  0









⊥ Β =  and  t
T
t e ' α ν =  define, respectively, the permanent 
and transitory shocks.  
Equation (7) can be rewritten as 
 
t t t L Ge G L C X ν ) ( ) (
1 Ω + Φ = + Φ = ∆
−                                                                          (8) 
          
i.e. as a moving average representation of  t X ∆  in terms of  the vector of permanent 
and transitory shocks  t ν , where it is assumed that  ) ( ) (
1 L G L C Ω =
− . A standard 
Choleski decomposition of cov( t ν ) ensures mutual independence of the shocks and 
brings about the permanent-transitory Gonzalo and Ng decomposition.
8 Impulse 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
page 22) and (ii) a Wald test for the joint significance of all lagged endogenous VAR variables 
up to the selected lag.   
8 Details on the identification role played by the Choleski decomposition are provided in 
Gonzalo and Ng (2001, page 1532). 
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response and variance decomposition analyses can then be performed in terms of 
permanent and transitory innovations.  
In a cointegrated system we expect a time series to have a large weight in the 
permanent innovations and a small weight in the transitory innovation if the 
corresponding error correction term coefficient is small. If, on the other hand, the 
corresponding error correction coefficient is large,  it will have a small weight in the 
permanent innovations and a large one in the transitory innovation. These hypotheses 
are corroborated by the decomposition of the forecast error variance of the variables 
in  t X ∆  and have relevant economic implications.  
Table III VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION 
The table gives the fraction of the total variance in the forecast errors of  t R log ∆ , 
t σ log ∆ ,  t M log ∆  and  t r log ∆  that is due either to the three permanent shocks 
combined or to the transitory shock, orthogonal by construction to the permanent 
ones. The transitory shock accounts for the majority of  the variance of the two year 
ahead forecast error of  t r log ∆  in Chile and in Singapore, and a significant fraction of 
the variation  t R log ∆  in the remaining countries of the sample where permanent 
shocks account for the majority of the variance of the remaining variables.
9   
The temporary innovation is an important component of the variance of the forecast 
error of reserves in most countries and the latter are pivotal in the dynamic process. 
They adjust but slowly to cointegration disequilibria, however, since they react more 
to permanent than to transitory shocks, even in the countries where they are the 
variable upon which the transitory shock has the largest impact. The monetary 
                                                           
9 We could associate, following Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), the temporary shock with 
interest rate behavior in Chile. The same reasoning links the three permanent shocks with 
reserves in Singapore. No clearcut association is possible in the remaining countries, where 
both permanent and temporary shocks account for the  variability of all the variables.     15
authorities seem to react mostly to shifts in the variables co-moving with the reserves 
that they perceive as permanent. Furthermore, the relevance of the temporary shock 
in most reserve forecast error variance decompositions suggests that the latter do not 
adjust rapidly to the permanent changes in the variability index, imports and interest 
rates.
10      
 
3 Analysis of the error correction process  
 
Having assessed that – with the exception of Singapore and Chile - reserves play a 
relevant role in the adjustment mechanism, we further investigate the nature of this 
process. More precisely, we set out to analyse the impact of “news” on the speed of 
adjustment of the stock of reserves to its equilibrium value. We refer to “news” as 
either reserve misalignments, or shifts in drivers of international capital flows, such as 
the US Federal effective fund rate, or changes in international competitiveness, 
measured by real effective exchange rate first differences.  
 
3.1 The impact of positive and negative reserve misalignments 
 
We first assess whether the adjustment of reserves to their equilibrium value is 
affected by the sign of  misalignment in the previous period, i.e. whether their speed 
                                                           
10 These shifts are not followed by a full adjustment of reserves to their trend value thus 
generating a transitory component and a temporary cointegrating error. This is not the case of 
Chile and Singapore, where reserve variation is not affected by the temporary shock, and 
reserves adjust rapidly to permanent innovations in the remaining variables in the 
cointegration equation. In these two countries the coefficient of the interest rate could be 
misleading; it indicates the impact of  the permanent component only, which accounts for but 
a tiny fraction of  interest rate variation.   16
of adjustment depends on a previous accumulation (decumulation) phase with respect 
to the long run attractor.
11 Asymmetric adjustments, according to Granger and Lee 
(1989), may be analysed partitioning the error correction term to allow for different 
speed of adjustment on either side of the attractor. 
Thus the estimated error correction term of the previous time period is partitioned 
into positive and negative deviations from the attractor - according as to whether it 
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and  t t EC ε =  is the residual  of the cointegration equation (6).
12 
Equation (4) thus becomes    
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where it is posited that 
+
− − = 1 1 t t t EC EC H  and 
−
− − = − 1 1 ) 1 ( t t t EC EC H , in order to simplify the 
notation. 
Table IV ASYMMETRIC VECM ESTIMATES 
Table IV presents evidence of asymmetric behaviour driven by the previous period’s 
accumulation phase. The coefficient estimates, which measure the speed of 
adjustment for positive and negative deviations from equilibrium, differ greatly across 
                                                           
11 For a previous attempt to test this hypothesis, see the non linear error correction analysis in 
Bilson and Frenkel (1979). 
12 It should be noticed that we are not performing here the M-TAR threshold cointegration test 
of Enders and Syklos (2001). We are simply assessing the impact of changes in the zt-1  signal 
variable on the speed of adjustment.    17
the countries of the sample. In the case of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia 
the coefficient of 
−
−1 t EC  is statistically significant and (in absolute value) larger than 
both the 
+
−1 t EC  and the linear 
1 − t EC ones. Hence, despite the fairly small size of the 
estimates, whenever international reserves fall below their desired level 
* R  the 
authorities react more rapidly (the half-life of a deviation from long-run equilibrium is 
of 6.47 months on average), being anxious to reduce exposure to external shocks, 
which may be extremely harmful in the case of a shortage of reserves. On the 
contrary, for Venezuela, Malaysia and Korea, the 
+
−1 t EC  coefficients exceed in absolute 
value both the 
−
−1 t EC  and linear  1 − t EC coefficients. This finding may be due to the 
authorities’ reaction to the cost of sterilized intervention, traditionally large both in 
terms of fiscal outlays and of the opportunity cost due to the foregone return on public 
investment and infrastructure.
13 According to Summers (2006), the latter reaches as 
much as 1.85 percent of the GDP of the ten leading holders of excess reserves. 
Mohanty and Turner (2006) point out that in the early 1990s large capital inflows 
brought about an increase in the annual cost of sterilized intervention by 0.25-0.50 
percent of GDP in several Latin American countries.  
  
3.2 The role of US monetary stance and external competitiveness on the 
speed of adjustment  
 
Empirical evidence of asymmetries in the sluggish process of adjustment leaves open 
the question of the relevance of news to the error correction mechanism. The issue is 
                                                           
13 The half-life of a deviation from long run equilibrium is, in these countries, somewhat longer 
and reaches 9.85 months on average  
   18
whether there are factors able to influence the process of bridging the gap between 
actual reserves and their equilibrium level.  
During the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s many emerging market economies 
had to face sudden capital reversals and costly currency depreciations with inadequate 
stocks of foreign reserves. It is not surprising that the local authorities should feel the 
need to self-insure against crises triggered by unexpected capital outflows, especially 
in the presence of negative discrepancies between actual and desired reserves, and 
that factors influencing international capital and trade flows should affect the speed of 
adjustment of reserves to their optimal level. In this section we analyse the impact of 
news both on international liquidity, using as a proxy changes in the US Federal 
effective fund interest rate, and on relative competitiveness, measured by changes in 
the real effective exchange rate ( t REER ).
14 
 
3.2.1 The impact of US monetary policy  
 
A number of studies suggest that capital flows are driven by common international 
factors. As shown by Calvo et al. (1996) and Mody et al. (2001), among others, shifts 
in US monetary policy influence emerging markets’ financial liquidity. A tight US 
monetary policy makes investment in these countries less attractive, raising debt 
price. The corresponding increase in the interest differential results in cross border 
financial outflows and eventually costly currency depreciations that may pass-through 
to inflation.
15 
                                                           
14 Both the Fed fund and the national REERt time series are I(1). Their first differences are I(0) 
and may be interpreted as “news”. 
15 See Arora and Cerisola (2001) and Uribe and Yue (2003). It is also believed that US 
monetary policy plays a significant role in triggering financial and banking crises since a rise in   19
The extent to which the local monetary authorities react to changes in the US interest 
rate depends, in principle, both on the nature of the exchange rate arrangements and 
on the monetary policy framework. Under a pegged exchange rate regime the 
reaction should be strong, in order to avoid the insurgence of a risk premium. Frankel 
(1999), however, found that also in free-floating countries (such as Brazil and Mexico) 
a positive shift in the Fed fund rate brings about a more than proportional increase in 
the domestic interest rate. The latter is due to the considerable effect of interest rate 
differentials on capital outflows and to the large premium pricing devaluation and 
default risks. Under an inflation targeting regime, a depreciation of the national 
currency may put price stability under pressure. The authorities’ fear of floating may 
thus increase the speed of accumulation of foreign reserves, which may be sterilized 
in order to prevent an increase in the money supply. 
According to the rationale mentioned above, if a US monetary policy tightening has an 
adverse effect on emerging markets’ financial stability, we would expect a positive 
impact of the first difference of the US Fed fund effective rate on the speed of reserve 
adjustment.  
On the contrary, a positive impact of US expansionary monetary policy on the speed 
of accumulation is plausibly explained by the fact that a large interest rate differential 
in favour of the home country may trigger huge capital inflows and hence a rise in 
reserves that is likely to be considered a threat to price stability -especially in the case 
of overstocking and under an inflation targeting regime.
16  
 The Heaviside indicator function for the US monetary policy is defined as  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
industrial country interest rates worsens the conditions for the access of emerging markets to 
offshore funds.  
16 Moreover, if the authorities intend to sterilize the increase in reserves, they will face higher 
opportunity costs as the interest rate differential augments. Evidence on this point is provided 









0     if       0








where  1 − ∆ USAt i  is the first difference of the Fed fund effective rate. The impact of the US 
monetary stance is then measured with the help of a modified version of equation (9), 
where  t H  is replaced by 
FED
t H  .  
+
− − = 1 1 t t
FED
t FEC EC H  and 
−
− − = − 1 1 ) 1 ( t t
FED
t FEC EC H  are 
then the error correction terms corresponding, respectively, to periods of  restrictive 
and expansionary US monetary policy.  
Table V ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN EQ. (9) 
Table V shows that for most countries one of the two asymmetric adjustment 
coefficients is statistically significant and larger - in absolute value - than the 
corresponding symmetric coefficient estimate, set forth in the first column of table II. 
The adjustment is more rapid in the case of a restrictive US monetary stance (the 
half-life time of the adjustment being 9.7 months, on average) than in the case of an 
expansionary one. As for Singapore and Chile, whose VECM estimates offer clear 
evidence of the role of interest rates in the adjustment mechanism, US monetary 
policy news affects interest rate changes and exerts no effect on reserves (see the 
last two rows in Table V). In both countries monetary policy has a primary objective in 
price stability while keeping exchange rate volatility under control.
17 Interest rates 
seem to react rapidly to Federal Reserve restrictive actions exerting an adjustment 
pressure on reserves via the long run relationship (6). 
To investigate the role of the previous period’s positive or negative discrepancies 
between actual and equilibrium (desired) reserves on the impact that news exert on 
the speed of adjustment, the Heaviside indicator was further modified, multiplying 
FED
t H and t H . The following relationship was estimated   
                                                           
17 For more details on monetary policy and sterilization of reserves see Tee (2005) for 
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Table VI INTERACTION BETWEEN EXTERNAL FACTORS AND RESERVE    
OVER/UNDERSTOCKING ( i β  COEFFICIENTS) 
 
The  i β  coefficient estimates set forth in table VI are highly informative. The local 
authorities seem to react more when reserves lie below their equilibrium level, as 
suggested by the significant increase in the speed of adjustment when the error 
correction term ECt is negative. Moreover, for most of the countries in the sample, the  
absolute value of the coefficients is much larger than in the estimates shown in table 
V – a finding that may be interpreted as evidence of a precautionary attitude.  A 
qualitative summary of the estimates of  i β  in equation (10) is presented in the matrix 
below. 
 
Countries for which the error correction coefficient in 
the equation (10) estimates is significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level 
    
+
−1 t EC  
 
−
−1 t EC  
 
 













3.2.2 The impact of changes in competitiveness  
 
The mercantilistic rationale behind reserve holdings is consistent with the decisions by 
Central Bankers to purchase foreign currency during a period of upward pressure on   22
the domestic exchange rate and conduct rather limited interventions on the downside. 
This policy may prevent the deterioration of national competitiveness in accordance 
with a deep-rooted mercantilist desire to maintain an undervalued exchange rate. This 
explanation agrees with the suggestion of Dooley et al. (2003) and Genberg et al. 
(2005) that emerging market countries build up reserves in order to support their 
exports. A sensible development strategy might then require a distortion in the real 
exchange rate in order to channel domestic investment towards export industries, and 
a process of reserve accumulation, which would appear sub-optimal, is in reality an 
element in an optimal investment strategy.  
We thus expect countries with a marked mercantilistic attitude to increase the speed 
of accumulation in times of real effective appreciation of the national real exchange 
rate (REERt). This line of reasoning offers only a partial view of the mercantilistic 
motive, which is better suited to economies exporting manufactured goods. 
Eichengreen (2004) argues that the export led growth model, while successful in the 
past, may now have a diminishing explanatory power in the case of most Asian 
economies. The knowledge spillovers have moved away from traditional traded good 
to areas such as software development, back office services and financial 
intermediation. This process requires balanced investments in both traded and non-
traded sectors (including human capital), which do not necessarily benefit from a long 
lasting currency depreciation.   
Along these lines, for commodity exporting countries an increase in the terms of trade 
(corresponding to a real appreciation) is by far more important than other forms of 
price competition.  This could imply that in periods of depreciation the increase in 
deficit (due to the increasing value of imports in terms of exports) and the pressure 
on foreign debt will lead the local authorities to change the rate of reserve 
accumulation, in order to reduce external vulnerability.  
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 where  1 − ∆ t REER  is the  1 − t  year on year percentage first difference of the national 
real effective exchange rate. In the asymmetric adjustment equation (9), where now 
REER
t t H H = , let 
+
− − = 1 1 t t
REER
t REC EC H  be the error correction term corresponding to a real 
effective appreciation and 
−
− − = − 1 1 ) 1 ( t t
REER
t REC EC H  the term corresponding to a phase 
of real effective depreciation. 
Table V shows that for Argentina, Brazil and Korea the coefficient of 
+
−1 t REC  in 
equation (9) is statistically significant and indicates that the speed of adjustment 
increases with appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. The opposite holds 
true for Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, where the 
coefficient of 
−
−1 t REC  is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance 
level. This finding is not surprising since the group is made up of economies 
characterised by a huge share of commodities in exports and/or a high degree of 
foreign presence in the real and financial sectors. The role of previous period positive 
or negative reserve discrepancies on the impact of competitiveness related news was 
analysed using the Heaviside indicator obtained multiplying 
REER
t H by t H . Equation (9) 
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The error correction coefficients estimates are set out in the last two columns of table 
VI. Here too, for the majority of countries, the dimension of the coefficients is much 
larger in absolute value than in the case of the unadjusted parameterization of table   24
V. In the matrix below the estimates are presented qualitatively, according to their 
significance at the 5 percent level. Most local authorities seem to react more rapidly in 
the presence of an excess demand of reserves, as suggested by the significant 
increase in the speed of adjustment when the error correction term ECt  is negative. 
 
 
Countries for which the error correction coefficient in the 
equation (10’)  estimates is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level 
   
+
−1 t EC  
 
−
−1 t EC  
   
   0 1 ≥ ∆ − t REER  














As for Malaysia and Singapore – small open economies with a sizeable foreign 
presence – they are characterized by a pegged or dirty floating exchange rate regime. 
Thus, assuming that the REERt changes are mainly due to changes of the inflation 
differential, the local authorities may be willing to control the stock of money and 
medium term inflation getting rid of reserves when in excess (selling foreign assets in 





Foreign exchange reserve accumulation has recently reached dimensions that are, at 
first sight, difficult to explain on the basis of standard cost opportunity considerations. 
We find, however, that the traditional buffer stock precautionary model continues to   25
provide a valid explanation of optimal reserve demand on the part of many emerging 
market economies. The cointegration approach implemented in the paper draws a 
distinction between factors entering the long run equilibrium demand for reserves and 
those operating only in the short run. Furthermore, it can be inferred from the 
variance decomposition analysis of permanent and transitory shocks to the 
equilibrium relationships that, in all but two cases, the stock of international reserves 
is the variable which brings about the readjustment over the long term. The other 
domestic variables seem to influence long run restocking decisions only if their 
changes are perceived as permanent by the local authorities. 
Along with domestic variables, such as the short term interest rate and the variability 
of the balance of payments, recent strands of the literature point to mercantilistic real 
exchange rate manipulation and fear of floating as relevant drivers in reserve 
management policies. Indeed, we established that these factors may affect the speed 
of adjustment of current reserves to their optimal long run level using estimation 
techniques that are compatible with cointegration analysis. In particular, news about 
“international liquidity conditions” and “competitiveness” – represented, respectively, 
by US monetary stance and domestic real effective exchange rate changes - has been 
shown to raise the speed of adjustment of reserves to their optimal (desired) level. 
Asymmetries entering the adjustment mechanism, either as previous over/under 
stocking of foreign reserves or as expansionary/restrictive US monetary stance or, 
finally, as over/under valuation of the real effective exchange rate, play a significant 
role. Indeed, there is strong evidence that international assets are stocked to reduce 
vulnerability to external shocks and avoid loss of competitiveness even if, in the long 
run, domestic precautionary motives are still predominant.  
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APPENDIX I 
Time series are monthly and cover the period between January 1985 and July 2006.  
Reserves excluding gold are series l1da quoted in US dollars from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics Data Base. International reserves do not include gold because of valuation 
problems and the modest amount of the precious metal  in EME reserve stocks. 
Interest rates are the money market rates in series 60b for Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Singapore. The deposit rate in series 60l was used for Chile. They 
are all from the IMF International Financial Statistics Data Base.    
Imports  are series 71da (cif quoted in US dollars) from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics Data Base. 
Real effective exchange rates  are  from the IMF International Financial Statistics Data 
Base. 
US short interest rate, the Federal fund effective interest rate is drawn from the Federal 
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APPENDIX II 
Table A.I – UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
  NP*     NP   
 Reserves    Domestic Short Term Interest Rate 
Argentina 
C, t, lag 1 
-1.62 I(1)  Argentina 
C, t, lag 7 
-1.59 I(1) 
Brazil 
C, lag 1 
0.01 I(1)  Brazil   
C, t, lag 9 
-2.07 I(1) 
Chile 
C, lag 13 
  0.85  I(1)  Chile 
C, t, lag 10 
-2.11 I(1) 
Mexico 
C, t, lag 0  
-2.25 I(1)  Mexico 
C, t, lag 6  
-2.26 I(1) 
Venezuela 
C, t, lag 1 
-1.51 I(1)  Venezuela 
C, lag 14 
-1.40 I(1) 
Indonesia 
C, t, lag 0 
-1.85 I(1)  Indonesia 
C, lag 1 
-2.17 I(1) 
Korea 
C, t, lag 8 
-1.96 I(1)  Korea 
C, t, lag 1,  
-1.69 I(1) 
Malaysia 
C, t, lag 2 
-1.82 I(1)  Malaysia 
C, lag 1 
-1.27 I(1) 
Singapore 
C, t, lag 8 
-0.91 I(1)  Singapore 
C, lag 2 
-1.22 I(1) 
Reserve Volatility  Value of Imports 
Argentina  
C, t, lag 14 
-2.80 I(1)  Argentina   
C, t, lag 3 
-1.73 I(1) 
Brazil 
C, lag 0 
0.15 I(1)  Brazil 
C, t, lag 13 
 -2.09  I(1) 
Chile 
C, t,  lag 0 
-1.84 I(1)  Chile 
C, t, lag 12 
-1.81 I(1) 
Mexico 
C, lag 0 
-1.17 I(1)  Mexico 
C, t,  lag 12 
-1.79 I(1) 
Venezuela 
C, t, lag 0 
-2.02 I(1)  Venezuela 
C, t, lag 1 
-3.43 I(0) 
Indonesia 
C, t, lag 0 
1.77 I(1)  Indonesia 
C, t, lag 5 
 -1.60  I(1) 
Korea 
C, t, lag 0 
    -2.04  I(1)  Korea 
C, t, lag 12 
-2.87 I(1) 
Malaysia 
C, t, lag 3 
-1.33 I(1)  Malaysia 
C, t, lag 13 
 -2.22  I(1) 
Singapore 




C, t, lag 15 
-2.13 I(1) 
 
 Notes. *: Ng Perron (2001)  unit  root test. The  GLS-detrended  autoregressive spectral density  
 estimator of  the  frequency zero  spectrum uses the modified AIC to  select  the  number of lags.   
  Critical values with constant, C, and trend, t: -3.42 (1 percent), -2.91(5 percent);  with  constant  
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APPENDIX III 
 
Table A.II - JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TESTS 
 
TRACE TEST STATISTICS 
List of variables in the VAR: Log (Reserves) = log Rt ; Log (Volatility of Reserves)= logσ t ; Log (Imports) = log Mt ; 
 Log (Domestic Interest Rate)= log rt  
 
  Hypothesized No. of 
Cointegration 
Relationships 




No. of Lags in 
VAR 
Argentina  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 











deterministic trend  
 
12 
Brazil  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 













Chile  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 











           trend 
 
6 
Mexico  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 
















Venezuela  None 
at most 1 












Indonesia  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 













Korea  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 














Malaysia  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 

















Singapore  None 
at most 1 
at most 2 
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Table I – DOLS COINTEGRATION EQUATION ESTIMATES 
 
                            t t t t t t r b M b b t R ε σ ρ ρ = − − − − − log log log log 3 2 1 0                                      (6) 
 
  -ρ0  - ρ1   - 1 b  - 2 b      - 3 b    N. of leads and 









































































 (0.09)  --  0.32 
(0.07)  3 
Indonesia 
 0.48 

















  -0.51 
  (0.10) 
 
    -1.32 
(0.13) 
0.62 




    
   -0.01 
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Table II – ERROR CORRECTION COEFFICIENTS 
         t j t
k
j




1 ' α                                                            (5)  
 
 
Error correction coefficients  of the equation of 
 
t R log ∆   t σ log ∆   t M log ∆   t r log ∆  
VAR order 
VAR Lag   
Exclusion  

























5.0 (lag 1) 
[0.02] 
  17.0(lag 3) 
[0.00] 
19.6 (lag 1) 
[0.24] 




















0.1 (lag 1) 
[0.69] 
0.7 (lag 3) 
[0.87] 
16.2 (lag 1) 
[0.44] 





















1.0 (lag 1) 
[0.31] 
1.3 (lag 3) 
[0.73] 
18.2 (lag 1) 
[0.31] 









  0.058* 
(0.028) 
 












17.6 (lag 1) 
[0.35] 

















1.1 (lag 1) 
[0.29] 
4.4 (lag 3) 
[0.22] 
5.7 (lag 1) 
[0.77] 




















     2.8 (lag 1) 
[0.08] 
    19.7 (lag 3) 
[0.00] 
12.4 (lag 1) 
[0.71] 




















 1.4 (lag 1) 
[0.23] 
 6.5 (lag 3) 
[0.09] 
12.0 (lag 1) 
[0.74] 





















 0.5 (lag 1) 
[0.49] 
 1.2 (lag 3) 
[0.75] 
 
28.2 (lag 1) 
[0.03] 










  0.176* 
(0.060) 
 








 2.5 (lag 1) 
[0.12] 
 3.4 (lag 3) 
[0.34] 
31.4 (lag 1) 
[0.01] 
25.7 (lag 3) 
[0.06] 
 
Notes. *: significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level; 
+ : Ljung Box Q-statistic test for conditional 
heteroskedasticity; °: Johansen (1995) VECM residual autocorrelation LM test; standard errors are in parentheses and 
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) log log ( h t t h t R E R + + ∆ − ∆  
 
) log log ( h t t h t E + + ∆ − ∆ σ σ  
 
) log log ( h t t h t M E M + + ∆ − ∆
 
 
) log log ( h t t h t r E r + + ∆ − ∆  
 H  P  T P T P T P T 
1  28.80 71.20  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  28.52  71.48  99.49 0.51 99.53 0.47 42.40  57.60 
3  32.21  67.79  99.39 0.61 99.52 0.47 70.69  29.30 
4  33.83  66.17  99.39 0.61 99.37 0.63 72.28  27.72 
 
Argentina 
24  69.01  30.99  98.88 1.12 97.57 2.43 86.36  13.64 
          
1  10.06 89.94  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  9.91 90.09  96.63 3.37 99.32 0.68 93.77 6.23 
3  9.92 90.08  95.96 4.04 98.97 1.03 93.75 6.25 
4  10.26  89.74  95.53 4.47 98.76 1.24 93.64 6.35 
 
Brazil  
24  10.67  89.33  95.39 4.61 94.67 5.33 93.40 6.60 
          
1  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00  27.56 72.44 
2  99.58 0.42 99.98 0.02 99.97 0.03 33.73  66.27 
3  99.31 0.69 99.93 0.07 98.15 1.85 37.30  62.70 
4  99,27 0.73 99.93 0.07 97.01 2.99 44.40  55.60 
 
Chile  
24  98.81 1.19 99.62 0.38 97.81 2.19 46.48  53.52 
          
1  73.25 26.75  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  72.80  27.19  99.99 0.01 99.99 0.01 97.87 2.13 
3  73.26  26.74  99.77 0.23 99.99 0.01 97.34 2.66 
4  74.35  25.65  99.77 0.23 99.85 0.15 97.60 2.40 
 
Mexico 
24  77.04  22.96  98.19 1.81 99.82 0.18 97.23 2.77 
          
1  77.98 22.02  100.00 0.00      100.00 0.00 
2  77.43 22.57 92.24  7.76      96.61  3.39 
3  72.22 22.78 92.28  7.72      95.57  4.43 
4  77.29 22.71 92.35  7.65      95.54  4.46 
 
Venezuela 
24  77.52 22.48 92.18  7.82      94.58  5.42 
           
1  76.04 23.96  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  76.00  24.00  98.15 1.84 99.78 0.22 92.94 7.06 
3  75.95  24.04  97.48 2.52 99.69 0.30 93.14 6.86 
4  75.99  24.01  97.47 2.53 99.64 0.36 93.34 6.66 
 
Indonesia 
24  76.35  23.64  93.27 6.73 94.33 5.67 88.08  11.92 
           
1  76.66 23.34  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  76.91  23.09  98.94 1.06 99.97 0.03 99.71 0.28 
3  76.64  23.36  98.90 1.10 98.73 1.27 98.77 1.23 
4  76.96  23.04  98.78 1.21 98.34 1.66 97.75 2.25 
 
Korea 
24  79.24  20.76  97.33 2.66 97.55 2.45 95.49 4.51 
          
1  62.03 37.97  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2  64.79 35.21 82.64 17.36 99.95  0.06  99.04  0.95 
3  66.58 33.42 82.78 17.22 99.55  0.45  98.75  1.25 
4  67.46 32.54 82.95 17.05 99.49  0.51  96.94  3.06 
 
Malaysia 
24  70.40 29.60 83.35 16.65 99.18  1.82  93.56  6.42 
          
1  100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00  0.05  99.95 
2  98.99  1.01  11.68 88.32 57.37 43.63  0.58  99.42 
3  98.81  1.19  11.60 88.40 52.61 47.39  0.62  99.38 
4  98.79  1.21  11.61 88.39 51.77 48.23  0.62  99.38 
 
Singapore 
24  98.78  1.22  11.61 88.39 51.66 48.34  0.62  99.38 
 
Notes. Fraction of the variance in the H-month ahead forecast error due to innovations in the permanent shocks P and 
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Table IV – ASYMMETRIC VECM ESTIMATES  
  
              








e EC EC X
e EC H EC H X R
1 1 2 1 1
1
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1 1 2 1 1
1
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1 β   2 β  
VAR 
order 


























21.2 (lag 1) 
[0.17] 













0.2 (lag 1) 
[0.65] 
0.7 (lag 3) 
[0.87] 
 
22.5 (lag 1) 
[0.13] 











1.0 (lag 1) 
[0.32] 
1.2 (lag 3) 
[0.76] 
 21.6 (lag 1) 
    [0.15] 
 19.1 (lag 3) 














16.7 (lag 1) 
[0.40] 












1.2 (lag 1) 
[0.27] 
4.5 (lag 3) 
[0.21] 
9.7 (lag 1) 
[0.37] 















10.3 (lag 1) 
[0.85] 














2.5 (lag 1) 
[0.11] 
5.9 (lag 3) 
[0.12] 
 
12.4 (lag 1) 
[0.72] 












0.4 (lag 1) 
[0.54] 
0.9 (lag 3) 
[0.83] 
29.4 (lag 1) 
[0.02] 












2.9 (lag 1) 
[0.09] 
3.7 (lag 3) 
[0.29] 
30.4 (lag 1) 
[0.02] 




+ : Ljung Box Q-statistic test for conditional heteroskedasticity; °: Johansen (1995) VECM residual 
autocorrelation LM test; standard errors are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets; *: significantly 
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Table V - ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN EQ. (9) 
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H ; *: significantly different from zero 
at the 5 percent level.   38
Table VI - INTERACTION BETWEEN EXTERNAL FACTORS AND RESERVE 
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Note. *: significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 